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REFLECTIONS ON JUSTICE
FRANCIS J. QUIRICO'S CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEIRDRE

H. HARRIS'"

Francis J. Quirico retired from the Massachusetts Supreme Ju
dicial Court on February 18, 1981 after nearly twenty-five years
on the bench. Justice Quirico served as a judge of the superior
court for thirteen of those years and as a justice of the high court
for the remainder. A native of Pittsfield, Justice Quirico has a deep
and abiding love for western Massachusetts and its people. His
thorough, methodical, and incisive style, together with his personal
demeanor of quiet patience and courteousness, have earned him
the respect and admiration of the Commonwealth's legal community
and of all those who worked with him. Many consider him to have
been the most able jurist on the court during his time there. It is
possible that with the passage of time he will be assessed as one of
the Commonwealth's greatest judges. It is certain that he is one of
the finest human beings ever to sit on the Massachusetts bench.
EARLY CAREER

Justice Quirico has devoted his life to the law. He was born on
February 18, 1911, one of eight children of Luigi and Lucia
Quirico, who had emigrated from Italy in 1905 and had settled in
Pittsfield. He attended public schools in Pittsfield, graduated from
* A.B., Vassar College; J.D., Suffolk University Law School; law clerk to Justice
Francis J. Quirico, 1979-80; associate in the law firm of Parker, Coulter, Daley &
White, Boston, Mass. The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of
Stephanie Cleverdon, Anthony Musimianno, Michael Keating, Gael Mahoney, and
Margot Botsford.
The section concerning the Small Loans Trials was written by Michael B.
Keating, a partner in the law firm of Foley, Hoag & Eliot in Boston, and law clerk in
the superior court from 1965 to 1966. Mr. Keating served as clerk to Justice Quirico
in one of the trials.
Material for the section concerning the Boston Common Garage Trials was con
tributed by Gael Mahoney, a partner in the Boston law firm of Hill & Barlow. Mr.
Mahoney served as special assistant attorney general for the purpose of trying the
Boston Common Garage Cases. He handled both trials and both appeals.
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Pittsneld High School, and then attended Northeastern University
School of Law, graduating cum laude in 1932. While at Northeast
ern, he supported himself by working in a Boston cabinet-making
shop, and to this day he is an accomplished furnituremaker.
He was admitted to the Massachusetts bar the same year he
graduated from law school and thereafter was admitted to the
United States District Court for Massachusetts, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and, in 1939, to the United
States Supreme Court. From 1932 to 1942, Francis Quirico en
gaged in private legal practice in Pittsneld. His practice was inter
rupted by World War II when he served in the United States
Army Air Corps. He rose to the rank of captain during the war
years and returned to Pittsneld to resume his practice following the
war.
From 1948 to 1952 he served as city solicitor for the City of
Pittsneld. During his tenure in that office, he became a recognized
authority in the neld of municipal law. He helped to revise the city
charter and wrote legal opinions which his successors still consult
from time to time. He served as vice president of the Massa
chusetts Bar Association and president of the Berkshire County Bar
Association. He was active in Pittsneld civic organizations,
including the Berkshire Athenaeum and Hillcrest Hospital. At
various times he was chairman of the city's rent control board and
of the school building commission.
SUPERIOR COURT YEARS

In 1956, Governor Christian A. Herter, a Republican, nomi
nated Francis Quirico, a Democrat, for a vacancy on the superior
court. Governor Herter did not know Mr. Quirico, but he was at
the top of a list of candidates prepared by a screening committee
the Governor had established to advise him on judicial appoint
ments. Early news reports indicated that there was opposition
within the Republican ranks, but Governor Herter said that he had
received only one "mild" letter of opposition and a "good many let
ters" in support of his choice. l Francis Quirico was sworn in as an
associate justice of the superior court on September 4, 1956.
He quickly established himself as an outstanding legal scholar
with a broad and profound knowledge of the law and an extraordi
nary capability in the trial of complex and extended lawsuits. He

1.

Boston Globe, June 5, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
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earned the reputation of being an effective administrator, and he is
emulated by judges today in their efforts both to reduce congested
dockets and to provide for the fair and efficient administration of
the court system.
THE SMALL LOANS TRIALS

In 1964, a Suffolk County special grand jury returned 144 in
dictments which charged several small loan companies, certain of
their employees, and several public officials with offering or paying
bribes, soliciting or receiving bribes, or conspiring to commit any
of these crimes. 2 The indictments concerned the efforts of defen
dant companies to purchase favorable state regulation for the small
loan industry.
The so-called Small Loans Trials, as the indictments came to be
called, had great importance for several reasons. First, the stakes
were enormously high, not only for the individual defendants but
also for the corporate defendants, national companies whose right
to conduct business in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and
elsewhere depended upon licenses. Second, the indictments were
the result of an investigation of corrupt practices in government
conducted by the Massachusetts Crime Commission. The Commis
sion's investigations were perceived by some as politically motiv
ated, and the resulting indictments were controversial for that rea
son. Third, the sheer number of defendants and charges posed
significant case management difficulties for the superior court.
Recognizing the tasks con&onting the trial court, Chief Justice
C. Joseph Tauro selected a steady and reliable judge, superior
court Justice Quirico, to preside over the entire proceedings. Be
ginning in 1964 and continuing for more than three years, Justice
Quirico presided over all facets of the Small Loans Trials, from
pretrial motions through two jury trials. The task was indeed enor
mous. Recognizing the stakes, defendants hired the elite of
the Massachusetts criminal bar, over twenty-five attorneys, who
launched the best financed and most exhaustive defense to the in
dictments ever witnessed. Hundreds of pretrial motions were filed,
and evidence was heard for sixty-five court days.3 The transcript of
those proceedings covered 4,730 pages. 4 The first trial, which in

2. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 200, 275 N.E.2d 33,
42, (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972).
3. Id. at 200-01, 275 N.E.2d at 42.
4. Id. at 201, 275 N.E.2d at 42.
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cluded forty-nine of the 144 indictments, lasted five months. 5 The
second trial, involving twenty-one indictments, was the longest
criminal trial in the history of the Commonwealth: it lasted 222
days and extended over a twelve-month period. 6
From the outset, the strategy adopted by defense counsel was to
ensure that, in the event that guilty verdicts were reached, some
where in the course of the protracted proceedings Justice Quirico
would commit at least a single reversible error. To that end de
fendants filed every motion known, and in some instances un
known, to have the indictments dismissed. Defendants took more
than 5,400 exceptions to Justice Quirico's rulings. In their appeal
to the supreme judicial court, the four corporate defendants and
eight individual defendants who had been convicted7 designated
700 numbered multiple assignments of error. 8 These efforts were
to no avail, however, for on November 4, 1971 the supreme judi
cial court handed down a IBB-page decision, Commonwealth v.
Beneficial Finance CO.,9 which affirmed all judgments from both
trials.
Throughout that decision, the supreme judicial court drew atten
tion to the care and thoroughness with which the trial court had
considered each of the matters raised by counsel below, both at
the pretrial stages and during the trials. The fullness of the trial
record was of great assistance to the appellate court. The pretrial
motions advanced many objections of considerable complexity which
required full evidentiary hearings. For instance, the use of a legisla
tive investigation to develop a case for the grand jury was asserted to
violate article 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts
Constitution. 10 On this issue alone, Justice Quirico conducted a fac
tual hearing which included the testimony of seventeen witnesses.
He made extensive findings of fact and rulings of law. 11 When this
issue reached the supreme judicial court, there was a full record
upon which the court could rely in reaching its decision.
Justice Quirico had ensured that defendants were given every op
portunity, at all stages, to make a complete factual record on any
motion or objection presented. Moreover, despite the difficulties of
5.

Id.
Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 201,275 N.E.2d at 43.
9. Id. at 188, 275 N.E.2d at 33.
10. Id. at 203-04,275 N.E.2d at 44.
11. Id. at 204,275 N.E.2d at 44.
6.
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keeping track of the motions and the evidence thereon, Justice
Quirico had taken the time to make extensive findings and rulings.
He believed that it was incumbent upon him to set forth in writing
the rationale upon which he based each of his decisions. His findings
and rulings contained 1,400 printed pages. In many instances, as a
testament to his considerable abilities, the supreme judicial court's
opinion simply adopted as the basis of its decision the rationale set
forth in Justice Quirico's rulings below.
To have presided over cases as complex as these without
permitting reversible error to occur and to have overseen the devel
opment of a complete factual record to facilitate the task of the su
preme judicial court are accomplishments which alone deserve tre
mendous credit. Justice Quirico's performance as a trial judge,
however, far surpassed even those objectives. In the course of the
most protracted proceedings, involving at least twenty-five aggres
sive trial counsel, Justice Quirico was unfailingly courteous and po
lite to those who were before him. On no occasion, despite occa
sional provocation, did he ever appear to be angry or upset. His
patience was extraordinary. His good humor always was available to
lighten the load for everyone. He had a firmer grasp of the rec
ord in the case than anyone in the courtroom. His prodigious recall
preserved order in what otherwise might have been chaos. He
worked harder than anyone. He appeared to epitomize the ideal
trial judge: Intelligent; patient; diligent; courteous; and always in
control. Although the bar may remember Justice Quirico most for
. the scholarship of his legal opinions, those lawyers who were privi
leged to be before him in the courtroom will remember that as
their finest hour.
THE BOSTON COMMON GARAGE TRIALS

Justice Paul C. Reardon, in his tribute to Justice Quirico, indi
cates that as a superior court judge Justice Quirico was often as
signed complex and politically sensitive trials. In 1963, Justice
Quirico presided over two trials of persons charged with larceny
and conspiracy in connection with the construction of a parking ga
rage under the Boston Common.
Indictments were handed down in 1962 against six defendants,
including two attorneys, one of whom also sat as a district court
judge, and four officials of the Massachusetts Parking Authority.
Justice Quirico presided over the two trials in their entirety.
The first trial, of three of the defendants, began on March 2,
1963 and lasted two weeks. The Commonwealth introduced evi
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dence of complex schemes by defendants to obtain payments from
the state-funded Massachusetts Parking Authority. 12 Justice Quirico
directed verdicts of not guilty on indictments charging extortion
and conspiracy to extort, and the jury convicted all three defen
dants oflarceny and conspiracy to commit larceny,13
The second trial of three defendants began in early June 1963
and lasted about six weeks. Again the evidence was complex. The
jury convicted two defendants of larceny by false pretenses and
conspiracy and acquitted the third. 14
According to the prosecutor, Justice Quirico "conducted those
trials in an absolutely masterful way."15 He always remained in to
tal control of the courtroom despite efforts by an impressive array
of criminal defense lawyers to unbalance the trial and introduce er
ror. He was "never rumed for a minute land was] . . . the most
unflappable judge I have ever seen. "16 His charge to the jury was
lucid, delivered in readily understandable lay language, and deliv
ered without notes while "looking each juror straight in the eye. "17
When humorous moments arose, Justice Quirico readily appreci
ated them and handled them adroitly.
Both trials were followed by appeals to the supreme judicial
court. IS According to the prosecutor, the appeals were as hard
fought as the trials. In another tribute to the fine judicial crafts
manship and sensitivity of Francis Quirico, the court found no er
ror in either trial. 19 The opinions reflect his careful building of the
record, his concern for defendants' rights, and the overall expertise
with which he conducted the trials. 20

12. In 1958, Governor Furcolo signed legislation establishing the Authority as
"a body politic and corporate" for the purpose of constructing, operating, and main
taining a garage under the Boston Common. 1958 Mass. Acts, ch. 606.
13. The appeals from these verdicts are found in Commonwealth v. Kiernan,
348 Mass. 29,201 N.E.2d 504 (1964).
14. The appeals from these verdicts are found in Commonwealth v. Monahan,
349 Mass. 139,207 N.E.2d 29 (1965).
15. Interview with Mr. Gael Mahoney, in Boston, Mass. (Oct. 28, 1980). See
note * supra.
16. Id.

17. ld.
18. Commonwealth v. Monahan, 349 Mass. 139, 207 N.E.2d 29 (1965); Com
monwealth v. Kiernan, 348 Mass. 29, 201 N.E.2d 504 (1964).
19. 349 Mass. 139, 172,207 N.E.2d 29, 48 (1965); 348 Mass. 29, 59, 201 N.E.2d
504, 521 (1964).
20. The Boston Globe once reported that "[Justice] Quirico's methodical ap
proach to any job he undertook has earned him the respect of even those whom he
overruled or found guilty." Boston Globe, June 5, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
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THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT YEARS

In October of 1969, Governor Francis W. Sargent, a Repub
lican, repeated a pattern set thirteen years earlier by Governor
Herter by reaching into western Massachusetts to name Democrat
Francis Quirico to the state's highest court. Like Governor Herter,
Governor Sargent did not know Francis Quirico. Francis Quirico
had solicited neither position and had never contributed anything
to the political campaigns of either governor. 21 When he intro
duced Justice Quirico at a press conference, Governor Sargent de
scribed him as a "self-made man, a man of experience and wisdom
second to none in this Commonwealth. "22 With his characteristic
humility, Justice Quirico replied, "I hope that I can live up to all
that is expected of me. "23
Justice Quirico succeeded Justice Arthur E. Whittemore of
Hingham, who had died unexpectedly. Justice Quirico was the first
American of Italian descent named to the state's highest tribunal.
He first sat for oral argument on December 1, 1969. His first pub
lished opinion was MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 24
a zoning case. Thereafter, the former city solicitor wrote many
opinions dealing with various facets of municipal law.
It is beyond the scope of this biographical article to assess the
supreme judicial court opinions of Justice Quirico in any manner
that would begin to do justice to his wide-ranging and brilliant ca
reer as an appellate jurist. Here, the author offers only some gen
eral observations about Justice Quirico's opinions.
Justice Quirico's appellate opinions are perhaps best known for
the remarkable sense of historical and legal balance they both
illustrate and espouse. He is deeply committed to the principle of
separation of powers, and particularly to the clear delineation of
the separate roles played by the legislature and the courts. In what
may well have been his last major dissent, Justice Quirico re
ponded to the court's attempt to quell with finality legislative ef
forts to enact a death penalty law for Massachusetts. He wrote:
I believe that the court, by its decision in this case, has com
pletely stripped the Legislature of the constitutional power
which it has heretofore possessed and exercised for two hundred

21. Id.
22. Boston Herald American, October 30, 1969, at 3, col. 1.
23.

[d.

24.

356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970).
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years to determine, in its wisdom and discretion, when and in
what circumstances the public good requires the imposition of
the death penalty for murder in the first degree....
. . . I conclude that the Legislature has the power to make
that decision under the provisions of the Constitution of this
Commonwealth, and I reach that conclusion without regard to
any personal views which I may have ori the "expediency, wis
dom, or necessity" of capital punishment. 25

As one who knows Justice Quirico, the author speaks with some
confidence in saying that his dissent in this case, as in so many oth
ers, bespeaks his commitment to judicial adherence to matters con
stitutionally within the purview of the judiciary. It does not offer
approbation of this or any other law enacting a death penalty. The
theme of deference to the constitutional powers of the legislature is
present throughout his appellate opinions, particularly in his well
known dissents. 26
That restraint is confined, however, to his sense of the judicial
role, to established rules of appellate procedure, and to principles
of judicial reasoning. In a case where he feels the court is
venturing into an area reserved by the state constitution for the
legislature, or where the parties have not properly brought their
case before the court, he says so unequivocally without denigrating
the salutariness of the result or the worthiness of the merits. In a
case he sees as properly presented to the court and properly pre
senting novel issues within the purview of the judiciary, he will not
hesitate to write a far-reaching opinion. 27
25. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2231,
2273, 2284-85 (Quirico, J., dissenting).
26. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 401 N.E.2d 360, 372-76
(Mass. 1980) (Quirico, J., dissenting), vacated, 49 U .S.L.W. 3269 (Oct. 14, 1980)
(court read ambiguity into statute where none existed, then effectively rewrote it);
McCarthy v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 371 Mass. 667, 686-90, 359 N.E.2d
291, 303-06 (1977) (Qui rico, J., with whom Reardon, J., joins, dissenting) (court
effectively rewrote ballot access statute); Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Serv., 361
Mass. 480, 490-99, 281 N.E.2d 53, 59-64 (1972) (Quirico, J., with whom Reardon, J.,
joins, dissenting) (disapproval of arbitrary judicial line-drawing of legislative power
to accord veterans employment preference, especially in case where facts do not
show discriminatory impact).
27. See, e.g., Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney General, 407 N.E.2d 309 (Mass.
1980) (regulations of attorney general under state consumer protection act have force
and effect of law); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144, 355 N.E.2d 315,
318-19 (1976) (cause of action exists in Massachusetts for intentional or reckless in
fliction of severe emotional distress without resulting bodily injury); McDonough v.
Whalen, 365 Mass. 506, 511-12, 313 N.E.2d 435, 438-40 (1974) (abolishing doctrine
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His OpInIOnS abound with common sense, eloquently ex
pressed. He is not swayed by intelligently conceived obfuscation.
In oral argument and in single justice sessions,28 he quickly cuts
through verbiage and asks questions reaching the core of the case.
This same quality is reflected in his opinions. He writes forcefully,
persuasively, and clearly, often setting forth a treatise which pulls
together important cases in a particular area. 29
Justice Quirico is also well known for his willingness to reach
far back into history if he believes the answer to the issue before
the court lies there. For example, in the landmark case of Boston
Waterfront Corp. v. Commonwealth,30 he applied the "public
trust" doctrine to a disputed piece of land in Boston Harbor. He
reached back to early Roman and English law and traced the doc
trine through Massachusetts history from colonial times to the
present. 31 His opinions, which were often separate opinions, fre
quently utilized this approach of offering historical perspective to a
legal question before the court. 32 Much more could be said about

that independent contractor who has completed and turned over control of negli
gently constructed work to owner is not liable to those with whom contractor is not
in privity); Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 705-13, 308 N.E.2d 467,
477 (1974) (extending common-law duty of reasonable care by owner or occupier of
land to "trespasser who has become helplessly trapped on the premises to the own
er's knowledge"); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 67-71, 284 N.E.2d 222, 227-29
(1972) (establishing common-law basis for right of recovery for wrongful death);
George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 255, 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (1971)
(creating cause of action for intentionally inflicted emotional distress with concomi
tant bodily harm).
28. Under MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 211, §§ 14-19 (West 1958), a single just
ice of the supreme judicial court has original jurisdiction to hear certain matters and
may issue orders or reserve and report cases to the full court.
29. See, e.g., Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363 Mass. 800, 805-20, 298 N.E.2d 847,
850-58 (1973) (review of authorities pertaining to immunity of public officials from
personal liability in tort for official acts); Powers v. Building Inspector of Barnstable,
363 Mass. 648, 651-58, 296 N.E.2d 491, 495-98 (1973) (review of cases on noncon
forming uses under zoning ordinances or by-laws); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60,
67-71, 284 N.E.2d 222, 227-29 (1972) (review of authorities dealing with source of
right to recover for wrongful death); Commonwealth v. Wojcik, 358 Mass. 623,
625-30, 266 N.E.2d 645, 646-49 (1971) (review of fourth amendment cases to date);
Pritchard v. Mabrey, 358 Mass. 137, 140-44,260 N.E.2d 712, 714-17 (1970) (review of
cases dealing with a landowner's liability due to snow, ice, or water running into pub
lic way which freezes and injures passersby).
30. 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979).
31. Id. at 358.
32. See, e.g., Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373
Mass. 178, 196-97, 366 N.E.2d 717, 727-30 (1977) (Quirico, ]., with whom Liacos, J.,
joins dissenting) (legislative scheme dates back 300 years); Commonwealth v.
Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783,800-11,364 N.E.2d 1052, 1063-68 (1977) (tracing history of
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Justice Quirico's appellate opinions, but a thorough evaluation lies
beyond the scope of this article. The author wishes to close this ar
ticle with some personal observations about Francis Quirico.
A newspaper article once said that Justice Quirico "is re
spected by colleagues for his legal knowledge, devotion to work
and judicial temperament. "33 That is true as far as it goes. The
judge is a quiet, thoughtful man; when he speaks, he commands
attention. He is not concerned with showmanship or impressions.
He is concerned with truth and will seek it until he is satisfied that
he has come as close as humanly possible to it in a given case,
even if it means a delay in issuing an opinion. He is gentle and
kind and has been loved as well as respected by those who have
been privileged to work closely with him-his colleagues, and par
ticularly his law clerks. Those of us who have been honored to
serve in that position have been immeasurably enriched as attor
neys and as people.
function of jury in criminal cases to determine questions of law, such as degrees of
murder); Opinion of the Justices, 360 Mass. 877,886-87,271 N.E.2d 335, 341 (1971)
(Quirico, J., dissenting) (fact that jury has consisted of 12 persons for centuries indi
cates criminal defendant has fundamerital right to jury of 12); Commonwealth v.
Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 552-55, 270 N.E.2d 389, 392-93 (1971) (historical roots of
statute for punishment of delinquent or "stubborn" children).
The dissenting opinion in Opinion of the Justices, 360 Mass. at 877, 271 N.E.2d
at 335, was Justice Quirico's first dissent.
33. Boston Evening Globe, Oct. 28, 1969, at 3, col. 4.

